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Behavior Analysis and CRM Management 
USING APPLIED BEHA VlOR ANALYSIS TO COMPLEMENT ERROR 
MANAGEMENT IN CREW RESOURCE M4NAGEMENT EDUCATION 
William G. Rantz 
r 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the science of applied behavior analysis and its potential integration into current research and 
practice of threat and error management for internal crew behaviors. Discussions provide insight into how an 
Antecedent-Behavior-Consequence (ABC) analysis of behavior can reveal to educators, the antecedents and 
consequences for at-risk crew behavior. This paper will redefine crew at-risk behaviors as anti-error behaviors that 
prevent internal error occurrence. This new perspective will complement and enhance the total threat-error process 
model. Finally the challenges and implications of using crew reinforcement to maintain anti-error behavior using 
modified lineoriented flight training (LOFT) will be discussed. 
Mat is Applied Behavior Analysis? 
Behavior analysis is not new to the field of psychology, 
however using behavior analysis within the field of aviation 
psychology, as evidenced in the literature, appears to be a 
novel approach whose time may be approaching. Some 
researchers (e.g., Rantz, Olson, & Dickinson, 2001) are 
using new applications of behavior analysis to provide 
improvements to student landing performance in a flight 
training environment. "Despite the obvious relevance of 
this simple behavioral formulation to the understanding of 
kctors such as motivation, the effects of incentives and 
deterrents and the e£fkcts of past experience on future 
behavior, virtually no systematic attention has been paid to 
it by aviation psychologists" (Fuller, 1994, p. 174). 
"Behavior analysis, far from representing an alternative to 
cognitive theory, may be regarded as complementary to it" 
(Fuller, 1994, p. 187). Behavior analysis is the scientific 
study of how environmental events cause changes in 
observable behaviors. While behavior analytic theory is 
regularly applied to private behavior (e-g., thoughts and 
feelings) when applicable, this paper will emphasize 
behavior analysis applied to the pilot's environment and 
hidher observable behavior. 
Brethower (2000) provides a pragmatic overview of the 
behavior analysis of instruction in the following statement: 
Behaviorists say that, at any moment in time, what a 
person brings to a specific situation is fixed. Whatever 
the person's intelligence is, whatever the person's 
personality is, whatever the person's goals and dreams 
are, they are what they are. What we can manipulate or 
change to improve performance is some part of the 
environment. Behavior analysts begin by asking this 
sort of question: 'What aspect of this environment can 
we change to improve this performance? We aren't 
talking about broad-brush issues as changing inner-city 
neighborhoods, we are talking about specific changes 
such as altering the frequency of feedback or the 
rewards or the instruction. (p. 432) 
Applied behavior analysis implicates the importance of 
scientifically collecting data regarding observable behavior 
because observed behavior itself is valuable (Miller, 
1997). One aspect of behavior analysis used in 
IndustriaVOrganizational psychology is to teach individuals 
how to implement performance management and 
performance improvement techniques in the work place 
and evaluate their efkctiveness (Daniels, 1989). Behavior 
analysis strategies typically employ objective measures of 
work performance, goal setting, performance feedback, and 
positive reinforcement. Evaluation strategies based on the 
on-going analysis of work performance over time allow 
individuals to make database management decisions about 
new and existing performance management systems. 
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This notion of behavior observation, data collection, and 
the on-going analysis of crew performance corresponds to 
the work of the crew resource management (CRM) 
researchers at the University of Texas at Austin (UT- 
Austin), led by Dr. Robert Helmreich. "Effective CRM 
programs are data driven, using information fkom surveys, 
observations ofnormal operations, and detailed analyses of 
errors, accidents, and incidents. Effective programs are 
both specific and practical. They deal with observable 
behaviors and eschew vague generalities and what is often 
called 'psychobabble"' (Helmreich, 2000, p. 2). 
Current Threat-Error hfanagement 
Threat-error management awareness and practicing 
behaviors that detect errors are important components of 
human factors training. The practice of error management 
assumes the traditional elements of safkty including, rules, 
safety training, and safety culture preexist in the 
appropriate governmental agency, employer organization, 
- training department, and individual. These traditional and 
vitally important elements areused as layered safety shields 
to stop errors before becoming accidents (Reason, 1997). 
The current error management troika consists of avoidance 
of the error, trapping incipient errors before they are 
committed, and mitigating the consequences of errors that 
occur and are not trapped (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 
1999). Currently the UT-Austin model of threat and flight 
crew error management consists of four levels. These 
include; external threats (expected or unexpected events 
and risks including external errors), internal threats (crew- 
based errors), crew action (CRM behaviors or error 
detection and appropriate response behaviors), and 
outcomes (a safer flight, recovery to a safer flight, 
additional error, or a crew-based accidentlincident). 
There are five potential error types within each level of 
the model. The first is identified as intentional 
noncompliance errors (conscious violations of Standard 
Operating Procedures [SOPS]). The second is procedural 
errors (mistakes in procedures). The third is 
communication errors (errant internal or external verbal 
behavior). The forth is proficiency errors (deficient 
technical flight skills). The last error type is operational 
decision errors (operational decision parameters outside the 
SOPS and Federal Aviation Regulations [FARs]). 
Helmreich, Klinect, and Wilhelm (1999) identified three 
general crew behaviors related to errors: trap the error, 
exacerbate the error, and fail to respond to the error. 
Failing to respond to an error can not constitute an 
observable crew behavior and perhaps results in 
exacerbating the error in the form of non-behavior. The 
definition of error is deviation fiom accuracy or 
correctness; a mistake, as in action or speech. This 
definition defhlts to a reactive posture when managing 
errors that occur during the flight. 
Therefore, it is suggested that to reduce errors within 
the flight environment and specificaljy the levels ofinternal 
threats and crew actions, the boundaries of bus be shifted 
forward, fiom the reactive behaviors of error management 
to the behaviors that cause the errors. Or better yet, 
identification of the behaviors, that if present, would avoid 
or minimize error development. It is believed that with 
training and reinforcement for appropriate, anti-error crew 
behavior, errors occurring within these two levels can be 
reduced significantly. How is it possible to improve safe 
crew behavior before an internal or crew produced error 
must be trapped or mitigated? 
Shif Focus Upstream of the Error 
It has been postulated in a reactive saw triangle that 
for every accident there will have been a larger number of 
incidents and for every incident there will have been even 
a larger number of errors, and for every error there will 
have been a vast number of at-risk behaviors (Geller, 
1988). Many safety programs in business and industry 
focus on accident, incident, and errors when using 
measurement data to report changes in progress resulting 
fkom their safety initiatives. These programs f il to address 
the root cause of safety violations, that is, the at-risk 
behavior of the job perfbrmer. The key component to 
control of any safety program is the control of the unsafe 
behaviors that occur prior tothe error, incident, or accident. 
Behavior-based safety interventions, founded on behavior 
analysis, have been used for the past 20 years to reduce 
accidents, incidents, and errors in the work environment by 
decreasing at-risk behaviors and increasing safety related 
behaviors (Grindle, Dickiison, & Boettcher, 2000; Sulzer- 
Azaroff & Austin, 2000). 
The work of Seamester (Seamester, Prentiss, & Edens, 
1997) examines the verbal behavior of crews to determine 
which verbs are associated with improved CRM 
performance. This particular research attempts to identify 
more detailed observable CRM vocal behaviors (skills) for 
assessment and integration across operations. In the line 
operation safety audits (LOSA) conducted by the UT- 
Austin team, many specific behaviors were identified as 
evidence of error avoidance as well as error exacerbation 
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(Helmreich, Wilhelrn, Klinect, & Merritt, 2001). Both 
studies tend to emphasize the importance of particular 
observable CRM behaviors that should increase measurable 
performance output. The LOSA, among other things, is an 
objective checklist of observable crew behavior. The verbal 
behaviors that cause errors and avoid errors, identified by 
the LOSA, are the types of behaviors that must be 
pinpointed and used in the analysis of at-risk CRM 
behavior. The identification of these particular verbal 
behaviors will be the key to success. Verbal behavior can be 
defined as "behavior of an individual that has been 
reinforced through the mediahon of another person." 
(Skinner, 1957, p.2). It is very likely that most anti-error 
behavior will be verbal behavior of which specific vocal 
behavior will be used in a specific environmental context. 
However, the analysis should also include non-vocal 
communicative behaviors, such as gesturing. Because the 
consequences of behavior influence whether or not 
behaviors occur again, this type of analysis should first 
identi& the at-risk behavior of the consequences, which 
sustain it. Then the appropriate anti-error behavior (verbal 
or non-verbal) should be identified, and consequences 
altered so the anti-error behavior will occur (or be 
sustained), rather than the at-risk behavior. "Defining CRM 
in terms of specific behaviors has been a trend toward 
proceduralization of CRM, requiring interpersonal 
behaviors and communications as part of technical 
maneuvers. The positive side to this is clear guidance for 
crews as to expected behaviors and, concurrently, the 
ability to assess and reinforce their practice" (Helmreich et 
al., 2001, p. 18). 
The ABCs of CRM Flight Deck Behaviors 
One key component of behavior analysis is the use of 
an ABC analysis (Daniels, 1989; Krause, 1997). This 
analysis consists of observing the crew's behavior within 
the environment and identifjing the particular behaviors 
of interest. "An ABC analysis entails identifling relevant 
antecedents and consequences for behavior, where 
antecedents are stimuli or conditions that precede 
behavior and set the stage for or prompt it to occur; and 
consequences are stimuli or enditions that follow a 
behavior and change the probability that it will recur" 
(Olson & Austin, 200 1, p. 2 1). Once the particular causal 
error behaviors are identified, constructing an ABC 
analysis using a three-term contingency diagram will 
reveal which consequences within the environment are 
reinforcing the error behavior. The analysis will also 
identi@ the critical antecedents that should prompt the 
appropriate behavior, reducing "failure to respond" 
errors. 
Thus the ABC analysis, when complete, identifies the 
(a) conditions under which the behavior should occur, (b) 
the specific, observable anti-error behavior that should 
occur, and (c) the consequences that result when the anti- 
error behavior occurs. 
Components of an ABC Analysis 
Antecedent 
- - Behavior - - Consequence 
1 Glideslope interception I Lower landing gear I See three green lights 1 
The well-known performance management consultant, 
Aubrey Daniels said, "Every behavior has a consequence. 
In fact, behavior can be viewed as a hc t ion  of its 
consequences. That is, consequences do not simply 
influence what someone does; they control it. In order to 
understand why people do what they do, instead of asking, 
'Why did they do that?' ask, 'What happens to them when 
they do that"' (Daniels 1989, p. 24). The key to finding a 
good reinforcer is to look at what happens to the person 
immediately after the behavior. Strong reinforcers are 
positive (P), immediate (I), and certain (C) and when 
presented after a behavior, maintain the current fiequency 
of the behavior if it is at strength or increases the future 
fiequency ofthe behavior. However, many consequences in 
our environment are negative (N), delayed into the future 
(F), and uncertain (U) (Daniels, 1989). Negative 
consequences may punish an appropriate behavior, delayed 
positive consequences may reinforce an inappropriate 
behavior that occurs in between the appropriate behavior 
and the delayed consequence, and uncertain positive 
consequences may not occur frequently enough to influence 
an appropriate behavior. Additionally, delayed and 
JAAER, Spring 2002 Page 43 
3
Rantz: Using Applied Behavior to Complement Error Management in Crew Res
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2002
Behavior Analysis and CRM Error Management 
improbable consequences are often hard to identify. al., 2001). The error behavior was engaging in activity 
It has been mentioned that for the sake of increasing other than the required reading ofthe checklist response of 
operational efficiency, some violations such as intentional the moment. An ABC analysis should reveal other 
non-compliance errors are made. Sixty two percent of the consequences present in the environment, which may be 
total errors cited by the UT-Austin Team LOSA reinforcing behavior other than reading the checklist or 
observations revealed the crew's disregard in reading many may be punishing checklist reading behavior. 
checklist items required during operation. These were 
labeled as intentional non-compliance errors (Helmreich et 
Undesired Behavior: Crew not reading the checklist 
Antecedehts Conseauences 
Time to do other things 
Other environmental stimuli distract attention 
Seeing others not read checklist 
Doesn't believe an incident will occur 
Based on the ABC analysis, It would be prudent to reduce 
or eliminate error behavior or distractions resulting in not 
reading the checklist by reducing or eliminating the 
reinforcers responsible for that behavior. In turn, it would 
also be wise to increase the reinforcers for the anti-error 
behavior of reading the checklist. Using our example of 
crews not using the checklist we can analyze the 
consequences of that particular at-risk behavior. It becomes 
evident that the crew has some powerful positive, 
immediate, and certain reinforcers present that support 
behaviors other than reading the checklist and the negative 
consequences are too uncertain and far in the future to 
influence the current behavior. To establish the new anti- 
error behavior of reading the checklist, new environmental 
reinforcers must be made contingent upon it. Using the 
ABC analysis can reveal the need to include more positive, 
immediate, and certain reinforcers that are contingent 
upon the desired checklist reading behavior. The 
Less of a work load (P), (I), (C) 
Gets to attend other priority items (P), (I), (C) 
Might get reprimanded 0, @, (U) 
Might have an incident N, @I, N 
Desired Behavior: Crew r e d  fiom checklist 
Antecedents Consequences 
consequences, in turn, will increase the future frequency of 
that particular reading behavior. Detractions and 
interruptions of checklist reading behavior are an accepted 
f$ct of the operation. Airlines may wish to adopt specific 
vocal responses provided by the crew, which will establish 
an opening, "ReadyJor afer takeofcheck? " and a closing, 
'YAfer takeofcheck complete. "to each checklist segment. 
The contingent consequence to the final vocal response, 
closing segment could be a simple, "Goodjob, thnk your'. 
This would fulfil the (P), (I), (C), requirement of a good 
consequence. Therefore, intemrpted checklist reading 
behavior should be followed by a continuation of the 
segment and the closing consequence excluding any higher 
threat items. A fiirther example of ABC analysis requires 
CRM vocal behavior while encountering a potential threat 
in the instrument environment. 
Threat of disciplinary action 
Seeing others read checklist 
Just had a near miss 
Just came fiom training 
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ABC Analysis of Anti-error CRM Verbal Behavior 
Antecedent 
Threat increme 
ATC: Due to weather, hold at the 
AZO VOR at 8,000. Expect 
fiuther clearance 12502. Time 
now 12102. 
Behavior Consequence 
regard to weather movement, Alternative action envisioned and 
L I at EFC. I I 
This ABC analysis exhibits a potential threat increase 
in the flight environment in the form of holding 
instructions £tom ATC, which the crew recognizes. The 
crew's response is to use one particular anti-error vocal 
behavior to initiate a situational assessment. The results are 
multiple consequences for this behavior in the form of 
reducing the threat (P), (I), (C); agreement on the current 
state'and future course of action (P), (JJ, (C); and the 
Captain's acknowledgement of good crew performance (P), 
(I), (C). If pilots were trained in this process to understand 
the importance of positive immediate and certain 
consequences for appropriate behaviors many more anti- 
error behaviors would occur on the flight deck. The process 
to establish new contingencies of behavior on the flight 
deck requires training, reinforcers, and feedback within the 
educational environment and in line operations. 
Implications for Anti-error Reinforcement in CRM& LOFT 
Education 
"Key personnel responsible for training and evaluation 
of performance need special training in the concepts and 
assessment of threat and error management. It is essential 
that error management be evaluated and reinfirced not only 
in training but also in line operations. The major change 
here is in formally recognizing that error, in itself, is part 
of system operations and that effective error management 
can represent effective crew performance" (Helmreich et 
al., 2001, p. 21). 
There are several essential points required to maximize 
the educational resources needed to implement a behavior- 
based threat-error model of training. The first point is 
learning the principles of ABC analysis and understanding 
what happens to people when they behave in a particular 
way. This can be conducted in a classroom setting using 
many everyday examples and role playing techniques. The 
second point is to train this new behavior to fluency. 
Fluency is the term used for improving the accuracy and 
rate ofbehaviors. Training to fluency is no stranger to skills 
training in the aviation industry. This type of training is 
usually a function of technical flight skills training and yet 
is rarely used for CRM skills training. The same time used 
for traditional, full mission line oriented flight training 
&OFT) can be modified to adopt fluency training that 
shapes anti-error verbal behaviors in simulated 
environments. This type of training would shift the focus 
fiom using full mission LOFT scenarios to developing and 
evaluating CRM skills in a more frequent, shorter, and 
varied LOFT vignettes. This shift of training exposure 
would provide the crew with higher rates of practice and 
feedback with regard to particular modules of anti-error 
behaviors and in particular the contingent reinforcers and 
performance outcomes of those behaviors. Once the crew 
dem nstrated a variety of CRM skills, a 111 mission non- 
jeopardy LOFT would be used to conclude the training. 
Brethower and Smalley (1998) desaibe a performance 
based instructional method that uses a systems approach to 
training. This s y s t k  develops the contingencies of 
behavior, using a real-world approach, by providing guided 
observations, guided practice and demonstration of 
mastery. A new training system, based on this model, will 
shift the focus upstream, fiom the errors to the anti-error 
behaviors. This new proposed performance-based teaching 
system will allow the flight crew to first experience 
knowledge and rolaplay through guided observations fiom 
the classroom, secondly to experience guided practice 
during the LOFT vignettes and finally to demonstrate 
mastery in a more traditional 111 mission LOFT. Ensuring 
the success and maintenance of the anti-error behaviors is 
the final point. This may require a self-reporting, or inter- 
crew reporting observation and non-jeopardy feedback 
system of CRM performance. A simple system was used 
with a roofing crew, which showed immediate and lasting 
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changes in safety performance (Austin, Kessler, 
Riccobono, & Bailey, 1996). This type of system would 
provide immediate, positive and certain reinforcers to the 
flight crew with regard to their past performance and 
reinforce the error avoidance behaviors shaped during 
periodic recurrent training. A superb project management 
technique that approaches the high level of crew behavior 
observation and feedback is the Proficiency Assessment and 
Training System (PATS) being used by Ansett Australia. 
PATS uses an integration ofsimulator and line assessments 
and safety related feedback data, which determine training 
design needs. This intkated check and training system 
uses crew behavior and performance outcome measures 
during training and line checks to continually evaluate the 
effectiveness of the company's training program and 
pinpoint crew performances that require additional training 
(Henderson, 2000). To complement a PATS process, using 
behavior analysis principles, would include a direct 
- feedback link not just to the training department but to the 
crew during line checks. This proposed closed loop 
observation-feedback system would build the positive, 
immediate, and certain reinforcers required to establish 
contingencies of appropriate crew behaviors and 
performance. This could also include an on-going, non- 
jeopardy reward program that recognizes the "good" 
performance of crewmembers. 
There are seven essential elements that are required to 
integrate a behavioral approach into flight operations. They 
consist of the following: 
1. Assess current LOSA data to pinpoint verbal and 
nonverbal at-risk behaviors. 
2. Identification of consequences supporting at-risk 
behavior. 
3. Replace observed at-risk behaviors with various anti- 
error behaviors. 
4. ModiG the standard operating procedures to include 
appropriate consequences, which will sustain the various 
anti-error behaviors. 
5. Train crews in ABC analysis and inter-crew 
observations. 
6. Arrange for the crew to practice, through role-play, 
various anti-error behavior and consequence contingencies 
in class using shortened LOFT vignettes. 
7. Establish an objective inter-crew observation system 
which provides anonymous, non-punitive, and timely 
feedback of CRM behaviors to the crew and the training 
department, 
Summary 
It would be incorrect to imply that using behavior 
analysis and threat-error management affords pilots the 
opportunity to believe they are error-fiee. This dangerously 
assumes an "internalized" error-free attitude that a person 
carries with them fiom one environment to another. 
External environmental procedures, policies, technologies, 
training, feedback, and behavioral contingencies are the 
key elements to establish an error-reducing environment in 
which the highly trained human interacts. Line operational 
safety audits have shown that the current system oftraining 
does not eliminate crew errors on the flight deck. Many 
have said that errors can not be totally eliminated because 
errors are simply a function of having a human within the 
system. If this is so then we as scientists, psychologists, or 
educators are obligated to examine all behavioral principles 
that can provide evidence of performance change and use 
those principles as a means to complement error reduction 
methods already in existence. Behavior analysis, with its 
scientifically validated behavioral principles, has great 
potential to improve and balance the training initiatives of 
the threat-error process model in CRM. Shifting the 
intervention focus upstream fiom the error and targeting at- 
risk behavior gives the educator a proactive direction. 
Identifying -the antecedents and arranging behavior- 
strengthening consequences for anti-error behavior are the 
key for developing and maintaining anti-error behaviors. A 
vigorous, performance-based crew resource systems 
program that identifies, shapes and reinforces the 
appropriate anti-error behavior contingencies will provide 
that ounce of prevention thereby avoiding that pound of 
cure. O 
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